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Present: The Honorable MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD, U.S. District Judge  
 
 Deputy Clerk: Court Reporter: 
 Rita Sanchez Not Reported                     
 
 Attorneys Present for Plaintiff:  Attorneys Present for Defendant: 
 None Present None Present 
 
Proceedings (In Chambers):  ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS 
COMPLAINT [31]; DEFENDANT’S 
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE [32] 
 
Before the Court is Defendant Snap Inc.’s (“Snap”) Motion to Dismiss 
Complaint, filed on August 2, 2019.  (Docket No. 31).  On September 30, 2019, 
Plaintiffs Carly Lemmon, et al. filed an Opposition.  (Docket No. 36).  On October 14, 
2019, Defendant filed a Reply.  (Docket No. 40). 
The Court has read and considered the papers filed in connection with the 
Motion, and held a hearing on October 28, 2019.  
For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is GRANTED with leave to 
amend.  Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that there is a causal connection 
between Defendant’s Speed Filter and the car accident.  Moreover, as alleged, it is not 
clear whether their claim is barred under the Communications Decency Act because 
they have not sufficiently established that the Speed Filter is content-neutral. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs commenced this action on May 23, 2019.  (Complaint (Docket No. 1)).   
The Complaint alleges the following facts, which the Court takes as true and 
construes in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.  See, e.g., Schueneman v. Arena 
Pharm., Inc., 840 F.3d 698, 704 (9th Cir. 2016) (restating generally-accepted principle 
that “[o]rdinarily, when we review a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
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Procedure 12(b)(6), we accept a plaintiff’s allegations as true ‘and construe them in the 
light most favorable’ to the plaintiff”) (quoting Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc 
Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
This is a civil action arising out of a car accident that occurred on May 28, 2017.  
(Compl. ¶ 1).  Shortly before 7 p.m., seventeen-year-old Jason Davis was driving on 
Cranberry Road in Walworth County, Wisconsin.  (Id. ¶ 38).  Hunter Morby and 
Landen Brown were passengers in the vehicle.  (Id. ¶ 39).  The car crashed into a tree, 
and all three boys were killed.  (Id. ¶ 45).  Plaintiffs allege that Snapchat was a critical 
cause of the accident.  (Id. ¶ 1). 
Prior to the accident at issue in this case, one or more of the boys had 
downloaded the Snapchat app to their mobile phones.  (Id. ¶ 40).  At some point before 
the accident, twenty-year-old Landen Brown opened his Snapchat app.  (Id. ¶ 41).  
Shortly before 7 p.m., the car accelerated to a speed significantly above the speed limit.  
(Id. ¶ 44).  One “Snap” captured the passengers’ speed as 123 miles per hour.  (Id. ¶ 
45).  Driving at an excessive speed, the car ran off the road and crashed into a tree.  (Id. 
¶ 46).  The car burst into flames, and all three passengers were killed.  (Id.).  Walworth 
County Sheriff investigators estimated speed of the vehicle was 113 miles per hour at 
the time of the crash.  (Id. ¶ 48).  Plaintiffs allege that the passengers were motivated to 
drive at excessive speeds in order to obtain recognition and to share their speed 
through Snapchat, and that Snapchat encouraged and facilitated the boys’ excessive 
speeding.  (Id. ¶¶ 42, 43).   
Carly Lemmon and Michael Morby are residents of Wisconsin and the parents 
of Hunter Morby.  (Id. ¶ 2).  They assert claims for wrongful death as the surviving 
parents of Hunter Morby.  (Id.).  Michael Morby also asserts, as administrator of the 
estate, claims for his son’s personal injuries.  (Id.). 
Samantha Brown and Marlo Brown are residents of Wisconsin and the parents 
of Landen Brown.  (Id. ¶ 3).  They assert claims for wrongful death as the surviving 
parents of Landen Brown.  (Id.).  Marlo Brown also asserts, as administrator of the 
estate, claims for his son’s personal injuries.  (Id.). 
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Snap is a corporation located in California.  (Id. ¶ 4).  It is a social media 
company that supplies consumers with products focused on mobile photos and videos.  
(Id. ¶ 8).  Snap’s products allow users to create, upload, post, send, receive, share, and 
store digital content.  (Id.).  Snap’s primary social media product is its mobile 
application, Snapchat, which in turn has numerous products and features contained 
within it.  (Id.). 
Once downloaded, Snapchat continues to download and install upgrades, 
updates, or other new features directly to its users.  (Id. ¶ 9).  For some time before 
May 28, 2017, Snap created and distributed, within the Snapchat app, a feature that 
allows users to record their real-life speed, including as a driver or passenger, and 
overlay that speed onto a mobile photo or video.  (Id. ¶ 11).  Snapchat users can then 
share, on social media, that mobile photo or video with their real-life speed as a 
“Snap,” which is Snapchat’s messaging product.  (Id. ¶ 12). 
Snap rewards, in unknown, variable, and changing ways, users who consumer 
Snapchat in excessive and dangerous ways.  (Id. ¶ 13).  Such rewards include trophies, 
streaks, and social recognition.  (Id.).  Snap knows or should know that its design has 
created extreme and addictive behaviors by its largely teenage and young-adult users, 
and indeed, has purposefully designed its products to encourage such behavior.  (Id.). 
Snap knew or should have known that, prior to May 28, 2017, many of its users 
have been driving, or were passengers in, cars at speeds of 100 m.p.h. or more because 
they want to use Snapchat to capture a mobile photo or video showing them hitting 100 
m.p.h. and then share the Snap with their friends.  (Id. ¶ 15).  Plaintiffs allege that this 
is a game for Snap and many of its users, the vast majority of whom are teenagers and 
young adults.  (Id. ¶ 16).  Specifically, Plaintiffs provide the following explanation of 
the game: “Go as fast as you can until you hit 100 m.p.h., Snap a photo or video, and 
then share the 100-MPH-Snap on Snapchat.”  (Id.). 
Regardless of whether Snap intended to encourage dangerous speeding, Snap 
knew or should have known that it was, in fact, encouraging dangerous speeding, 
either by users while drivers or passengers.  (Id. ¶ 17).  Moreover, it was reasonably 
foreseeable that Snapchat would continue to motivate dangerous speeding.  (Id.).  
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Plaintiffs provide four illustrative examples of why Snap realized or should have 
realized that it was affecting the driving behavior of its users.  (Id. ¶ 18). 
First, before September 201, a petition on www.change.org called on Snapchat 
to address its role in encouraging dangerous speeding.  (Id. ¶ 19). 
Second, on September 10, 2015, Wentworth Maynard was catastrophically 
injured in Clayton County, Georgia, in a motor vehicle collision involving Snapchat.  
(Id. ¶ 20).  In a lawsuit filed by Maynard against Christal McGee and Snap, Maynard 
alleges that McGee wanted to share a Snap showing how fast she was driving and she 
was driving at excessive speeds because of Snapchat.  (Id. ¶ 27).  McGee was going 
approximately 107 m.p.h. at impact with Maynard’s car.  (Id. ¶ 29).  Maynard claims 
Snapchat facilitated McGee’s excessive speeding because McGee was motivated to 
drive at an excessive speed to obtain recognition and to share her experience through 
Snapchat.  (Id. ¶ 28). 
Third, in December 2015, a news report documented that three young women 
near Philadelphia, Pennsylvania were encouraged by Snapchat to drive at excessive 
speeds, and as a result, they crashed into a parked tractor-trailer.  (Id. ¶ 32).  All three 
died.  (Id.).  According to the news report, the victim’s families say that Snapchat was 
used on the night of the car crash.  (Id. ¶ 33). 
Fourth, in October 2016, a news report documented that two young people were 
driving near Tampa, Florida and using Snapchat.  (Id. ¶ 35).  The couple tracked their 
speed to over 115 m.p.h.  (Id.).  The couple lost control of their car and hit a minivan.  
(Id.).  Five people died as a result of that car crash.  (Id.).   
Despite its knowledge, Snap chose not to properly address the dangers it created.  
(Id. ¶ 37).  Snap also did not remove or restrict access to Snapchat while users travelled 
at dangerous speeds or otherwise properly addressed the danger it created.  (Id. ¶ 51).  
Snap’s initial and continued design decisions regarding Snapchat are unreasonable and 
negligent given the probability and seriousness of the danger of excessive speeding, the 
limited or non-existent usefulness of using Snapchat to capture driving at dangerous 
and illegal speeds, and the limited or non-existent burden on Snapchat to eliminate the 
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risks.  (Id. ¶ 52).  Furthermore, given Snap’s actual or constructive knowledge of the 
danger, Snap’s disclaimers are inadequate, unreasonable, and knowingly ineffective.  
(Id. ¶ 53).  
Based on the following allegations, Plaintiffs bring a claim for negligence and 
seeks punitive damages.  (Id. ¶¶ 54-61). 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
“Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when the complaint either (1) lacks a 
cognizable legal theory or (2) fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable 
legal theory.”  Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013). 
In ruling on the Motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court follows Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . 
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).  The Court must disregard allegations that are legal 
conclusions, even when disguised as facts.  See id. at 681 (“It is the conclusory nature 
of respondent’s allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that 
disentitles them to the presumption of truth.”); Eclectic Properties E., LLC v. Marcus 
& Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2014).  “Although ‘a well-pleaded 
complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof is improbable,’ 
plaintiffs must include sufficient ‘factual enhancement’ to cross ‘the line between 
possibility and plausibility.’”  Eclectic Properties, 751 F.3d at 995 (quoting Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 556–57) (internal citations omitted). 
The Court must then determine whether, based on the allegations that remain 
and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, the Complaint alleges a 
plausible claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; U.S. ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. 
Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2011). “Determining whether a 
complaint states a plausible claim for relief is ‘a context-specific task that requires the 
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” Ebner v. 
Fresh, Inc., No. 13-56644, 2016 WL 5389307, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 27, 2016) (as 
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amended) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Where the facts as pleaded in the 
Complaint indicate that there are two alternative explanations, only one of which 
would result in liability, “plaintiffs cannot offer allegations that are merely consistent 
with their favored explanation but are also consistent with the alternative explanation. 
Something more is needed, such as facts tending to exclude the possibility that the 
alternative explanation is true, in order to render plaintiffs’ allegations plausible.” 
Eclectic Properties, 751 F.3d at 996–97; see also Somers, 729 F.3d at 960. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Request for Judicial Notice 
Along with his Motion, Defendant filed a Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) 
on August 2, 2019.  (Docket No. 32).  On September 30, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an 
Opposition.  (Docket No. 37).  On October 14, 2019, Defendant filed a Reply.  (Docket 
No. 39). 
Under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if the Court considers 
matters outside the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss that motion must be 
converted into one for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).  As a general rule, “a 
district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion.”  Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). An 
exception to this general rule exists for (1) materials that are attached to or necessarily 
relied upon in the complaint, and (2) matters of public record.  Id. at 688-89.  
In the RJN, Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of three 
documents: (1) Snapchat’s pop-up warning that appeared on or before May 28, 2017, 
when a user first opened the speedometer-function filter on the app (the “Speed Filter”) 
(Docket No. 33-1); (2) Snapchat’s pop-up warning that appeared on or before May 28, 
2017, when a user exceeded 15 m.p.h. while using the Filer (Docket No. 33-2); and (3) 
Snap, Inc.’s Terms of Service in effect on or before May 28, 2017 (Docket No. 33-3).   
Defendant argues that the three documents are incorporated by reference in 
Plaintiff’s Complaint because Plaintiffs allege in the complaint that “Snap’s 
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disclaimers—are inadequate, unreasonable, and knowingly ineffective” but does not 
describe any of the warnings.  (Compl. ¶¶ 53, 56).  Defendant also asserts that the 
authenticity of the warnings are not in question because the concurrently filed 
declaration attests to the fact that these were these warnings in effect and that would 
have appeared on the version of the Snapchat app at issue here at the time of the 
accident.  (RJN at 3; Declaration of Phong Le (“Le Decl.”) ¶¶ 6-8 (Docket No. 33)). 
Plaintiffs oppose the RJN.  Plaintiffs first argue that Plaintiffs’ claims do not 
depend on any of the documents, and thus, are not incorporated by reference.  (Opp. to 
RJN at 1).  Plaintiffs also raise objections to each individual document.  As to the first 
two documents, Plaintiffs argue that Le does not have personal knowledge of what 
actually appeared on the Snapchat app and further assert that they “have good-faith 
reasons to question Snap’s beliefs as to what should have appeared in its app versus 
what actually appeared in its app.”  (Id. at 1).  Plaintiffs also object to the Court taking 
judicial notice of Snap’s Terms of Service because Le does not identify how and when 
the users agree the terms and whether it is done in a legal manner.  (Id. at 2).   
Plaintiffs’ objections are overruled for these reasons: 
First, Snapchat’s warnings have been incorporated by reference because the 
complaint challenges their adequacy.  As Defendant correctly points out, courts 
routinely incorporate warnings in such a situation.  See e.g., Eidson v. Medtronic, Inc., 
40 F. Supp. 3d 1202, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“[The plaintiff] directly challenges the 
sufficiency of the FDA-approved warnings and the contents of those warnings are thus 
incorporated in his complaint.”); Altman v. HO Sports Co., Inc., No. 1:09-CV-1000 
AWI (SMS), 2009 WL 4163512, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2009) (taking judicial 
notice of a warning label because “[the plaintiff] does not sufficiently question the 
authentication of the warning” and “the warning itself forms the basis for one of [the 
plaintiff’s] strict liability theories.”). 
Second, Plaintiffs’ challenge of the authenticity of Snapchat’s pop-up warnings 
is not persuasive.  “Authenticity for incorporation by reference means the same thing 
as it does in Federal Rule of Evidence 901: whether a document is what its proponent 
claims it is.”  Dual Diagnosis Treatment Ctr., Inc. v. Blue Cross of California, No. SA 
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CV 15-0736-DOC (DFMx), 2016 WL 6892140, at *23 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2016) 
(citing Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012)).  
Objections to incorporation by reference must be on legally cognizable grounds.  See 
Davis, 691 F.3d at 1161 (holding that a party's objection to incorporation by reference 
because he had not seen the documents before was not related to authenticity and was 
therefore not a valid objection).   
Here, Defendant has adequately established authenticity of the three documents.  
Along with the RJN, Defendant produced a declaration by Phong Le, who is a software 
engineering manager at Snap and has personal knowledge of Snapchat app, including 
its Speed Filter and the Snap’s Terms of Service.  (Le Decl. ¶¶ 2-4).  He also declared 
that he has personal knowledge of the warnings that appear when the Filer is opened by 
the Snapchat user, including the warning that appeared on version 10.9 of the app, 
which was the version that Plaintiff Brown had on May 28, 2017.  (Id. ¶ 5).  He further 
declared that the screenshots provided as Exhibits A and B are “true and correct copy 
of a screen shot” of the warnings that appear when a user first opened the [Speed] 
Filter or when a user’s speed exceeded 15 m.p.h. on Snapchat version 10.9.  (Id. ¶¶ 6, 
7).  He also declared that all Snapchat users must agree to Snap’s Terms of Service 
before using the Snapchat app.  (Id. ¶ 8).   
The Le Declaration is sufficient to authenticate the documents under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 901.  See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 
1146, 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (declarations that printouts were “true and correct” copies 
of internet pages, “in combination with circumstantial indicia of authenticity (such as 
the dates and web addresses)” would support reasonable juror belief that documents 
are what proponent claims).   
Therefore, The RJN is GRANTED.  The Court will take judicial notice of the 
three documents. 
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B. Choice of Law 
As a threshold matter, the parties dispute which state’s substantive law should 
apply in this matter.   
“In diversity jurisdiction cases, such as this one, [courts] apply the substantive 
law of the forum in which the court is located, including the forum's choice of law 
rules.”  First Intercontinental Bank v. Ahn, 798 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Plaintiffs brought the action in the 
Central District of California.  Accordingly, California’s choice-of-law governs. 
 California applies the governmental interest approach.  McCann v. Foster 
Wheeler LLC, 48 Cal. 4th 68, 87, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 378 (2010).  “In brief outline, the 
governmental interest approach generally involves three steps.”  Id.  “First, the court 
determines whether the relevant law of each of the potentially affected jurisdictions 
with regard to the particular issue in question is the same or different.”  Id.  “Second, if 
there is a difference, the court examines each jurisdiction’s interest in the application 
of its own law under the circumstances of the particular case to determine whether a 
true conflict exists.”  Id.  “Third, if the court finds that there is a true conflict, it 
carefully evaluates and compares the nature and strength of the interest of each 
jurisdiction in the application of its own law to determine which state's interest would 
be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state 
[citation] and then ultimately applies the law of the state whose interest would be more 
impaired if its law were not applied.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
Here, the parties disagree on whether California law or Wisconsin law should 
apply under the governmental interest approach.  However, at the hearing, both parties 
agreed that this choice-of-law dispute does not materially affect the Court’s analysis 
for the purposes of deciding this motion because the two state laws are substantially 
same for the two elements of negligence currently at issue: duty and causal connection.   
Accordingly, the Court does not determine which state’s substantive law applies 
for the negligence claim at this stage.   
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C. Failure to Allege a Negligence Claim 
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have failed to state a negligence claim.  To 
prevail on a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must prove four elements: “(1) [a] duty of 
care on the part of the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection 
between the conduct and the injury; and (4) an actual loss or damage as a result of the 
injury.”  Martindale v. Ripp, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 89, 629 N.W.2d 698 (2001).  
Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege that 
Defendant owed a duty and that there was a causal connection between the Speed 
Filter and the accident. 
1. Duty 
Under Wisconsin law, “all persons have a duty of reasonable care to refrain from 
those acts that unreasonably threaten the safety of others.”  Smaxwell v. Bayard, 274 
Wis. 2d 278, 298, 682 N.W.2d 923 (2004).  “This duty arises ‘when it can be said that 
it was foreseeable that his act or omission to act may cause harm to someone.’”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  “Thus, the existence of a duty hinges upon foreseeability.”  Id. 
Here, Defendant argues that it owes no duty as a matter of law because it was 
not reasonably foreseeable that providing users with the Speed Filter would result in 
harm.  (Mot. at 17).  According to Defendant, the Speed Filter is a tool that functions 
as a speedometer; it simply overlays a user’s speed on a snap that the user can share.  
(Id.).  Although Plaintiffs allege that the Speed Filter incentivizes and encourages 
speeding as part of a “game” between Snap and its users, Defendant argues that 
Plaintiffs provide no factual support for these conclusions.  (Id. at 18).  To the extent 
that Plaintiffs allege that a handful of accidents occurred relating to the app, Defendant 
also argues that such evidence is not sufficient to establish more than a bare possibility 
of injury given that Snapchat is an app with several hundred million users.  (Reply at 
19).  According to Defendant, this is particularly so because it provided express 
warnings of potential harm.  (Id.).   
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In response, Plaintiffs argue that they have alleged the precise way in which 
Snapchat is linked to dangerous speeding; that it is a “game for Snap and many of its 
users, the vast majority of whom are teenagers and young adults” to snap and share the 
“100-MPH-Snap.”  (Compl. ¶ 16).  In addition, Plaintiffs assert that the Complaint 
include allegations relating to at least three other fatal or near-fatal car accidents that 
occurred because a driver or a passenger wanted to take a Snap with a high speed.  
(Opp. at 6-7 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 20-36)).   
Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that Snap’s warnings are not applicable here because 
Plaintiffs do not allege that the driver was using Snapchat.  Instead, the passenger was 
the one who was attempting to snap.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs argue that Snap’s warning 
of “Please, DO NOT Snap and drive” was never violated.  (Opp. at 8).  Furthermore, 
Plaintiffs assert that they have alleged that any do-not-Snap-and drive warnings are 
“inadequate, unreasonable, and knowingly ineffective.”  (Id. (citing SAC ¶ 53)).  
Although not alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiffs argue in their Opposition that the 
warnings are not adequate because it only is provided when the user opens the Speed 
Filter and the language “Don’t snap and drive” appears only in the bottom right-hand 
corner in small font, in a color that blends in with the background.  (Id.). 
Taking all inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, the Court cannot determine that the 
harm from the Speed Filter was not foreseeable as a matter of law.  Plaintiffs allege 
that it was a “game” for Snap and its users to snap and share a 100 m.p.h. Snap.  
Plaintiffs further assert that accidents have occurred as a result of users attempting to 
capture such a Snap.  Therefore, this is not a situation where there is only “bare 
possibility of injury.”  Grube v. Moths, 56 Wis. 2d 424, 433, 202 N.W.2d 261 (1972).  
Moreover, although Defendant argues that Snapchat’s warnings make the harm less 
foreseeable, Plaintiffs challenge such an assertion because the warnings only cautioned 
against a driver from using Snapchat and because the warnings were inadequate.  
These are factual questions that the Court cannot determine as a matter of law.   
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a duty. 
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2. Causal Connection 
“The test of cause-in-fact is whether the negligence was a ‘substantial factor’ in 
producing the injury.”  Cefalu v. Cont'l W. Ins. Co., 285 Wis. 2d 766, 774–75, 703 
N.W.2d 743 (2005) (citation omitted).  “The phrase, ‘substantial factor,’ denotes that 
the conduct has such an effect in producing the injury as to lead a reasonable person to 
regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular sense.”  Id.  “There may be several 
substantial factors in any given case.”  Id.  “To prove that a tortfeasor's negligence was 
a substantial factor in producing a plaintiff's injuries, it must be shown that there was 
an ‘unbroken sequence of events’ where the negligence of the tortfeasor was actively 
operating at the time of the accident which produced the plaintiff's injury.”  Id. 
(citation omitted). 
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to allege that the Speed Filter was a 
substantial factor in causing the accident for several reasons.  (Mot. at 7).  First, 
Defendant argues that Davis’s reckless speeding—not Snap’s provision of the Speed 
Filter—caused the crash.  (Id. (citing Compl. ¶¶ 44, 46)).  Applying this principle, 
Defendant asserts that courts consistently have held that device manufacturers and app 
developers are not the cause of an accident where the harm results from a driver’s 
misuse of their products while driving.  (Id. at 7 (citing cases)).  Second, Defendant 
argues that the Complaint does not allege sufficient facts of the causal connection 
between the Speed Filter and the accident.  (Id. at 8).  Defendant notes that the 
Complaint does not allege that the Speed Filter was active on anyone’s phone at the 
time of incident; rather, it merely alleges that Brown, a passenger, opened Snapchat at 
some unspecified time prior to the accident and that at some point, a snap was taken 
showing a speed of 123 m.p.h.  (Id. at 8-9 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 44-45)).   
Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs cannot establish liability based on the 
encouragement liability theory.  Defendant asserts that the Speed Filter is a neutral 
speedometer that merely allows a user to record and share his or her speed on 
Snapchat, and Plaintiffs do not allege any facts to support their claim that Snap 
“encouraged” excessive speeding here.  (Id. at 9).  Defendant reiterated this argument 
at the hearing.  And even if Plaintiffs could allege in sufficient detail that the Speed 
Filter encourages speeding, Defendant argues that courts have rejected such 
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“encouragement liability” against manufacturers and held that the driver is solely 
responsible for reckless driving.  (Id. at 10).   
In response, Plaintiffs note that there may be more than one substantial causative 
factor, and a persons’ negligence need not be the sole primary factor.  (Opp. at 10).  
Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that the cases Defendant cites in support of its claim that 
device manufacturers and app developers are not the cause of an accident are 
inapposite.  According to Plaintiffs, those are distracted driving cases where the 
plaintiffs claimed that mobile phone themselves are dangerous products; courts have 
held in such situations that device manufacturers are not the cause of a crash that 
results from a driver’s misuse of their products while driving.  (Opp. at 10-11).  In 
contrast, Plaintiffs argue that they are not claiming that mobile phones or that Snapchat 
are necessarily dangerous; rather, the Speed Filter specifically is the danger. 
Plaintiffs also argue that they can plead a direct causal connection even if they 
do not allege that the driver Davis used the Speed Filter; according to Plaintiffs, the 
issue is about the need to capture the 100-MPH-Snap regardless of who captures the 
Snap.  (Opp. at 13).  Plaintiffs further argue that they do not need to specify how much 
time passed between when Brown opened Snapchat and when the crash occurred; 
Plaintiffs argue that whether the use of Snapchat was or was not too far removed from 
the crash is a fact dispute.  (Id.).   Finally, Plaintiffs rebut Defendant’s assertion that 
they cannot establish encouragement liability as a matter of law.  (Id. at 14).  Contrary 
to what Defendant has asserted, Plaintiffs assert that there are many cases where courts 
have recognized encouragement-liability despite the driver’s negligence.  (Id.).  At the 
hearing, Defendant reiterated that this situation warrants a finding of encouragement 
liability because the Speed Filter is the driving force behind the users’ decisions to 
speed. 
Although it is a close call, the Court agrees with Defendant.  As a preliminary 
matter, Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient details to demonstrate that the Speed Filter 
was used close in time to the accident.  Although Plaintiffs suggest in their Opposition 
that the crash occurred “within minutes” of the Snap, Plaintiffs acknowledge that they 
have not made such an allegation in the Complaint.  (See Opp. at 14).   
Case 2:19-cv-04504-MWF-KS   Document 44   Filed 10/30/19   Page 13 of 17   Page ID #:275
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL 
 
Case No.  CV 19-4504-MWF (KSx) Date:  October 30, 2019 
Title:   Carly Lemmon et al. v. Snap, Inc.   
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                  CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL                                               14 
 
Moreover, although Plaintiffs can allege liability based on the encouragement 
theory, they have not alleged sufficient facts to establish that Defendant actually 
encouraged speeding.  See Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 47, 539 P.2d 36 
(1975) (upholding a finding of negligence against a radio station because its broadcast 
of a giveaway contest “generate[d] a competitive pursuit on public streets, [which was] 
accelerated by repeated importuning by radio to be the very first to arrive at a 
particular destination.”).  Although Plaintiffs hint that Defendant have encouraged the 
users to speed by providing certain “rewards, in unknown, variable and changing 
ways,” such an allegation is too vague and speculative.  
Because the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged a causal 
connection, it does not examine whether Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege a 
negligence claim for additional reasons.  
D. Communications Decency Act 
Defendant additionally argues that Plaintiffs’ claim fails because it is barred by 
the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”).  (Mot. at 19).   
CDA provides that “[n]o provider . . . of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (emphasis added).  “The prototypical service 
qualifying for [CDA] immunity is an online messaging board (or bulletin board) on 
which Internet subscribers post comments and respond to comments posted by others.” 
Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). 
The Ninth Circuit provides a three-prong test for Section 230 immunity.  Barnes 
v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009).  Immunity from liability exists 
for “(1) provider or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks 
to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information 
provided by another information content provider.”  Id. at 1100-01.  “When a plaintiff 
cannot allege enough facts to overcome Section 230 immunity, a plaintiff’s claims 
should be dismissed.”  Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093, 1097 
(9th Cir. 2019). 
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Here, Plaintiffs only challenge the third prong.  Plaintiffs argue that they are not 
seeking to hold Defendant liable for another’s content, but rather Defendant’s own 
content, the Speed Filter.  (Opp. at 20).  Not surprisingly, Plaintiffs rely heavily on 
Maynard v. Snapchat, Inc., 346 Ga. App. 131, 816 S.E. 2d 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018), 
which examined this exact issue and held that CDA immunity does not apply.   
In Maynard, the plaintiffs brought an action against Snapchat, Inc. for 
negligence and loss of consortium to recover for injuries from a car accident that 
allegedly resulted from the use of Snapchat’s Speed Filter.  Id.  at 131.  The trial court 
granted Snapchat’s motion to dismiss because the CDA provided the defendant with 
immunity for its Speed Filter.  Id. at 133.  The Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed that 
the CDA provided the defendant with such immunity because the plaintiffs “d[id] not 
seek to hold Snapchat liable for publishing a Snap by a third-party that utilized the 
Speed Filter.”  Id. at 136.  “Rather, [the plaintiffs] [sought] to hold Snapchat liable for 
its own conduct, principally for the creation of the Speed Filter and its failure to warn 
users that the Speed Filter could encourage speeding and unsafe driving practices.”  Id.  
In fact, the plaintiffs pointed out that the other driver, Heather McGee, had not made 
an actual post to Snapchat prior to the car accident because she hit the plaintiff’s car 
before she was able to post on Snapchat.  Id. at 132.  Therefore, the court held that 
“CDA immunity does not apply because there was no third-party user content 
published.”  Id. at 136.   
In response, Plaintiffs’ arguments are belied by their Complaint; Plaintiffs’ own 
complaint targets Defendant’s decision to allow users to publish third-party content 
using the Filter rather than merely the Filter itself.  (Reply at 21).  Second, Defendant 
argues that Maynard is distinguishable because the court’s analysis there focused on 
the fact that no Snap was published.  (Id. at 23).  Finally, to the extent that Maynard 
held that Defendant can be held liable for the Speed Filter, Defendant argues that this 
argument is foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit’s decision Dyroff, which held that a 
plaintiff cannot “plead around” the CDA by challenging features – like the Speed 
Filter—as “content” themselves.  (Id. at 24). 
In Dyroff, the plaintiff brought an action against an operator of the Experience 
Project website after her son died from heroin overdose.  934 F.3d at 1094.  The 
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district court held that the defendant was immune from liability under Section 230 of 
the CDA, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.  Id.  Experience Project was a social 
networking website made up of various online communities or groups where users 
anonymously shared their experiences and posted and answered questions.  Id.  The 
site did not limit or promote the types of experiences users shared.  Id.  The website 
allowed users to register anonymously, and recommended users to join certain groups 
based on the content of their posts and other attributes and sent email notifications 
when a user posted content to a group.  Id.  The plaintiff’s son posted in a “heroin-
related group” regarding where to purchase heroin, received an email notification 
regarding his post, and ultimately connected off the site to purchase heroin.  Id. at 
1095.   
The plaintiff in Dyroff argued that the CDA did not apply because she was trying 
to hold the website for its own “content” – namely, the recommendation and 
notification functions.  Id. at 1096.  The Ninth Circuit disagreed.  The court determined 
that the defendant “did not create content on Experience Project, in whole or in part” 
and that “its functions, including recommendations and notifications, were content-
neutral tools used to facilitate communications.”  Id.  In doing so, the court 
distinguished this case from Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008).   
In Roommates.com, the Ninth Circuit held that Section 230 did not immunize a 
website, which matched people renting rooms with people looking for somewhere to 
live, from claims that it violated federal and state housing anti-discrimination laws by 
requiring subscribers to disclose, using dropdown menus and checkboxes, their sex, 
sexual orientation, and family status.  Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1098 (citing 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1161-2, 1165).  However, Roommates.com affirmatively 
required users to disclose information related to protected classes through 
discriminatory questions and answer choices.  Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1169.   
In contrast, the defendant in Dyroff did not require that users disclose that they 
were looking for heroin or other illegal drugs; rather, they were given something along 
the lines of blank text boxes.  Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1099.  In other words, the plaintiff 
was “unable to allege that [the defendant] materially contributed to the content posted 
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on Experience Project that led to [the plaintiff’s son’s] death” by “requir[ing] users to 
post specific content, mak[ing] suggestions regarding the content of potential user post, 
or contribut[ing] to making unlawful or objectionable user posts.”  Id.  Accordingly, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant was entitled to immunity under Section 230 as 
a publisher of third-party context. 
Here, the critical issue is whether the Speed Filter should be considered content-
neutral or not.  In other words, the parties dispute whether the Speed Filter is more like 
dropdown menus and checkboxes, which affirmatively requires subscribers to disclose 
certain content, or more like a blank text boxes, which imposes no similar restrictions.  
At the hearing, Plaintiffs argued that the Speed Filter is more like the former because it 
is the filter itself that is encouraging people to speed and capture a high-speed Snap.  
Defendant emphasized, however, that the Speed Filter is a content-neutral tool that 
merely allows people to measure and share the speed in a lot of harmless settings – 
such as on a plane or on a train.  Based on the facts alleged, the Court cannot determine 
the issue as a matter of law.  Because the Court is granting Plaintiffs leave to amend, 
however, they are encouraged to further explain how the Speed Filter itself is 
encouraging users to speed and snap such content.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED with leave 
to amend.   
Plaintiffs may file a First Amended Complaint on or before November 18, 2019.  
Defendant shall file a response by no later than December 2, 2019.   
IT IS SO ORDERED.  
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